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ABSTRACT 
The presence of organized crime is common across all income levels, but the 
effects of organized crime differ between low-income and middle-income countries. 
Institutionally, socially, and economically, criminal organizations make contributions 
which affect the states they are in. This paper theorizes that the contributions made by 
organized crime help development in low-income countries, then later harms 
development in middle-income countries. Empirical tests find that the direct effects of 
organized crime are not significant in low and middle-income countries. The indirect 
effects of organized crime – corruption in the public sector — have a negative effect on 
development.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As of 2018, 75% of the world’s population live in middle-income countries. Most 
of the world's countries have been able to develop out of low-income status, but are now 
stuck in the middle, unable to develop into high-income. This phenomenon is referred to 
as the Middle Income Trap, or MIT (Glawe & Wagner, 507). This paper builds off 
theories of MITs presented in Glawe and Wagner (2016) and assumes factors that help 
development in low-income countries (LICs) do not affect development in the same way 
in middle-income countries (MICs). The factor this study looks at specifically is 
organized crime. I argue organized crime can positively influence the development of 
LICs, and with the same mechanisms, negatively influence the development of MICs.  
 LICs and MICs require different factors of development to be emphasized in 
order to advance. Economic freedom and informal institutions are traditional contributing 
factors for development in LICs (Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan 2018). Economic 
freedom allows for things such as trade openness, savings, and population growth that 
encourage both economic and human development. Social organization also leads to 
advancement (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). In LICs, organization often comes from 
informal institutions. Informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions, and 
consists of rules and norms enforced by the consensus of the population. Informal 
institutions may have an exaggerated role in places where formal institutions are still 
developing. While informal institutions may not directly become formal institutions, they 
do influence who has power and what the population considered important. Informal 
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institutions are often more persistent than formal ones, and can undermine them 
(Pansters, 2018). One way organized crime sets up informal institutions is by establishing 
their own market system with trade networks and an informal economy to support their 
illegal activities. Especially in LICs, criminal organizations are able to reach sections of 
the population the state cannot. Either the population is geographically isolated, or not 
considered a priority enough to allocate the state’s limited resources to. In these cases, 
organized crime offers public goods and services in place of the state. Organized crime 
can also establish and enforce rules within a society. These may be social or economic 
rules, such as protecting private property -- and they again make up the informal 
institutions that may compete with formal institutions as the state develops and expands 
its reach. Through their illegal activities, organized crime can help develop an organized 
labor force as well as build up human capital. In places with little organization and few 
legitimate employment opportunities, organized crime creates an informal economy that 
financially supports people and increases trade. These help develop a labor force and 
build up human capital by offering employment opportunities where there may otherwise 
be none.  
 For further development in MICs, the literature points to improved governance 
and state capacity as significant factors. Improved governance includes establishing 
higher government effectiveness, regulation, better legal systems, higher property rights, 
and more political stability (Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan 2018). Organized crime has a 
vested interest in stopping these items and will work actively to make the state less 
effective in these areas. As such, we should expect MICs with high organized crime to 
have less capacity to continue developing. Additionally, the contributions made by 
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organized crime to development in the low-income stage mean obstacles to further 
development are already in place. The informal institutions set by organized crime may 
compete with or undermine formal institutions, and the informal economy or black 
market is difficult to tax and regulate. Formal institutions established with the presence of 
organized crime may have high levels of corruption, which further impedes 
development.  
 This study finds the direct effects of organized crime are not significant, 
regardless of income level. An additional indicator of organized crime which captures the 
indirect effects, ethics and corruption, has negative effects on development in both LICs 
and MICs. These results point to governance being a more important factor in 
development than trade in LICs and MICs, despite what the literature 
argues. Additionally, this paper does not find support for organized crime helping the 
development of LICs, but does find evidence organized crime harms the development of 
MICs.  
 The following paper outlines the differences between development in low and 
middle-income countries in more detail, a section on how organized crime contributes to 
development, a research design, findings and a conclusion. 
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOW-INCOME AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
For the current fiscal year of 2020, the World Bank defines low-income as 
economies with a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less, and middle-income as economies with 
a GNI per between $1,026 and $12,375. Each year these classifications are adjusted to 
accurately capture each lending group. Table 1 shows how income classifications have 
changed over the time period of this study.  
Table 1. World Bank Income Group Classifications 2008- 2018  
Year 
 
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Low income  
 <=  
975 
<= 
1,005 <= 1,035 <= 1,045 <= 1,005 <= 1,025 
Lower middle income 
 976- 
3,855 
1,006- 
3,975 
1,036- 
4,085 
1,046- 
4,125 
1,006- 
3,955 
1,026- 
3,995 
Upper middle income  
 3,856- 
11,905 
3,976- 
12,275 
4,086- 
12,615 
4,126- 
12,735 
3,956- 
12,235 
3,996- 
12,375 
High income  
 
> 11,905 
> 
12,275 > 12,615 > 12,735 > 12,235 > 12,375 
  
Countries move up income levels as their institutions improve and the state gains 
more capacity. Medina-Moral and Montes-Gan (2018) argue specific institutions increase 
economic and social performance in different stages of development.  The authors group 
countries into clusters of development-- less developed, intermediate, and advanced, then 
compare the countries’ status between 1996 and 2011. Successful countries are ones that 
have moved from either less developed to intermediate, or from intermediate to 
advanced, in that time. Measurements are based on a combination of GNI and HDI.  
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The authors find less developed countries had the worst scores in the legal system, 
property rights, rule of law, and government effectiveness. This finding indicates that a 
lack of governance hinders development. Intermediate countries scored better in 
governance and democracy. The authors find freedom to international trade to be the 
most important factor in a less developed country's advancement. In intermediate 
countries, good governance is the most significant factor in development. Countries that 
were the most successful were the ones able to adopt good institutions around economic 
freedom and governance. These included access to international trade, government 
effectiveness, regulation, legal frameworks and property rights, political stability, and 
rule of law. Based on these results, less developed countries are more likely to develop 
when they prioritize economic freedom early on.  
The likelihood of development also depends on institutions and social choices. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) address development by creating a framework around 
how and why democracy does, or does not, consolidate in developing countries. While 
economic development is not as closely tied to democratization as once believed (Olson, 
1993; Alamdari, 1994), democratic institutions are still a significant factor in a country's 
ongoing development, should they be well designed and implemented (Tarverdi, Seha & 
Campbell, 2019). Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) main argument is democracy 
consolidates when elites do not have a strong incentive to overthrow it. Incentives are 
determined by the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the 
nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of 
the economy, and the form and extent of globalization. 
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These determinants outline conditions that help countries develop. Civil society 
contributes to development as a well-organized population is necessary for positive 
changes in institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 31). The structure of these 
political institutions determines how much influence the elite have over the population 
and whether or not repression is a viable option (p. 33). Conditions outside the control of 
the state or the population also influence the course of development. Times of political or 
economic crises, and the nature of these crises, change how society and the state interact 
(p. 31). Likewise, the level of economic inequality also changes this interaction. 
Increased inequality corresponds with an increased revolutionary threat (p. 35). 
Additional determinants are the structure of the economy and the form and extent of 
globalization. These two determinants influence sources of income and how costly 
repression versus concessions is to the elite.  
While Medina-Moral and Montes-Gen (2018) argue trade is the most important 
factor in development for LICs and that governance is more important in MICs, that does 
not mean governance is not also important in LICs. This is something Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) touch on in their framework of democracy with political institutions 
(34). However, many LICs simply lack the capacity to govern all of the population. 
When that is the case, often extra-legal authorities emerge to fill the vacuum left by the 
state. de Oliveria and Penev (2011) pose that the buildup of globalization and the current 
method of governance has led to new forms of authority in states. These include sub-state 
actors on local levels, but also non-state actors taking on roles previously held by the 
state. Organized crime is one such non-state actor which, given the right circumstances, 
may emerge as an alternative authority to the state.  
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According to the authors, states that have broken up social relations or areas of 
contested sovereignty are most likely to have extra-legal authorities taking on roles 
traditionally held by the state. Other characteristics that lead to a power vacuum are low 
levels of state legitimacy, territorial vulnerability, privileged or dominant elites as well as 
little economic and social provision for the population, underdeveloped social 
institutions, and a high level of corruption. Taken together, these factors present low 
levels of governance. Most often, these types of states are located in the Global South.  
In addition to increased globalization, since the end of the Cold War, organized 
crime has become more centralized and more organized. Increased regulation in states 
has provided an incentive for criminal organizations to increase their capacity and expand 
their activities. Now many operate with a centralized structure in a defined, but 
changeable, territory outside the reach of the state. This autonomy combined with 
organization has allowed criminal enterprises to assume the role of an authority over the 
population where the state is lacking. While the state also has an organizational structure 
and some level of capacity, formal governments are a lot more restricted than criminal 
organizations. The state develops while being responsible for the whole country at once, 
as well as being responsible to standards set by international observers. Criminal 
organizations emerge where and when there is opportunity, without the rigidity of being a 
formal government. In order to carry out their goals of illicit profit, organized crime 
naturally assumes a role of power wherever they are. Organized crime also naturally 
takes advantage of networks of kinship, clan, and ethnic and social ties. This undermines 
the monopoly of power and authority the state should have over the population. In places 
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where the state is unable to enforce its authority, organized crime may take advantage of 
that absence and become an extra-legal authority for the population.  
While filling the vacuum left by the state, organized crime offers public goods to 
the population. Though organized crime exists primarily for the economic gain of those 
perpetuating it, Skaperdas (2001) explains how organized crime can interact with the 
population and offer a type of support when the state cannot.  
Organized crime emerges from a particular set of conditions -- regime change or 
revolution, prohibition, geographic isolation, and ethnic and social distance from the 
center of political decision making. All of these conditions represent an area that is not 
addressed by the state. With geographic isolation, places the state cannot or will not exert 
the energy to control allow for organized crime to emerge and fill in that role. With 
prohibition, any illicit goods or services with a high demand is attractive to organized 
crime. In this case, there is a need for an organizational structure and supply chain to 
deliver those goods or services and efficiently collect the profits. In a state of prohibition, 
organized crime steps in and becomes the unofficial channel to complete this process. In 
times of major political change, established institutions are often dismantled by the new 
regime, and the new ones take time to come into effect. This time allows organized crime 
to emerge as a power within the population. Finally, ethnic or social distance alienates a 
part of the population from the state authority or from society. From this, organized crime 
often emerges as an authority for this particular population.  
 Out of these conditions, organized crime exhibits primitive state functions 
(Fiorentini, 2009; Sung, 2004). In order to conduct their business, criminal organizations 
establish rules and enforce contracts, roughly equaling the rule of law. It also builds up a 
9 
 
 
 
market structure within the informal economy. In order to maintain their hold on the 
population, criminal organizations give out public goods such as protection and limited 
financial support. Essentially, organized crime will provide public goods and services in 
place of the state, but it will come at a much higher cost to the population.  
 The previous literature establishes that LICs need a market structure and internal 
organization in order to develop, and that the state cannot always provide those factors. In 
places where low income states cannot reach, organized crime is able to fill the vacuum 
by organizing the population, building up a market, and offering public goods. While this 
is helpful to LICs, MICs require different factors of development in order to keep 
advancing. As MICs have developed out of LICs, it is assumed middle-income states 
already have some degree of economic freedom, informal institutions, and social 
organization. These factors are essentially prerequisites for a country to reach middle-
income status. Once in the middle-income stage, it is important for countries to start 
emphasizing other factors of development. The following literature outlines what those 
factors are and how organized crime contributes to development in MICs. 
 Countries develop from LICs to MICs by establishing economic and social 
institutions that bring in revenue and organize the population (Medina-Moral & Montes-
Gen, 2018; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) Given the fact that few countries have been 
able to develop to high-income status, development in MICs is much more difficult. 
Economic and social institutions must be improved or changed, and improved 
governance becomes highly important.  
 Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic (2012) explain how a sharp deceleration in growth is 
common among countries that reach the middle middle-income stage of development, 
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referred to as the Middle Income Trap, or MIT. MITs are characterized by decreased 
growth with contrasting increasing productivity, a rate of stable but low growth, and 
stagnant innovation where talent is routinely misallocated. According to the authors, 
improving access to advanced infrastructure, enhancing the protection of property rights, 
and reforming the labor market to reduce rigidity counteracts MITs.  
 While LICs are able to develop by relying on labor intensive, low cost 
manufacturing based on imported technology, as the economy develops this system 
becomes less sustainable (Agenor et. al, 2012). Companies become more competitive, 
labor becomes less abundant, and wages become higher leading to a slow rate of growth. 
The solution to the MIT is to innovate and invest in different places. The authors 
recommend states early on pursue public policies aimed at improving access to advanced 
infrastructure such as high high-speed communication networks. These facilitate the 
spread of information and innovation. Better protection of property rights also advances 
innovation. Lastly, reformed labor markets allow people to seek higher education and not 
be dependent on factory work. These measures begin to discontinue the misallocation of 
talent and again foster innovation.  
 Low cost labor and manufacturing may help LICs develop, but in MICs, there 
needs to be more focus on innovation in order to continue developing. This means states 
need to pursue policies that change the market structure and allow the population to 
receive more education. These changes are not necessarily supported by organized 
crime.  
 Organized crime’s primary purpose is economic gain; therefore, it naturally 
brings in wealth and positively contributes to economic development. However, it is 
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organized crime’s negative contribution to governance that harms development, 
particularly in MICs. van Dijk (2007) explores the relationship between organized crime 
and the state while looking at the effects of organized crime on the rule of law, 
corruption, and the net wealth of countries. The author finds while organized crime has 
some ability to bring in wealth through its illicit activities, the negative effects of 
organized crime on governance undermines this addition to the economy. The author 
emphasizes how important good institutions are to economic development. Good 
governance leads to economic development, a professional police force, good rule of law, 
and an independent judiciary are more likely to lead to advancement than a sudden 
economic boost or foreign aid. The presence of organized crime then has negative effects 
on governance. There is a close link between organized crime and corruption, both in the 
police force and in the government in general. In such cases, the undue influence of 
organized crime hampers good governance and development.  
 Despite its negative effect on governance, organized crime may in some cases 
have a positive effect on the economy. Illicit trafficking often brings in a large amount of 
revenue to the formal and informal economy, as does rent seeking and money laundering. 
Van Dijk (2007) finds some middle middle-income countries, particularly in Latin 
America, would have far less wealth and may still be classified as low income without 
the contributions made by organized crime. Though overall, organized crime has negative 
effects on human development as well as a stronger negative effect of GDP (Uger & 
Dasgupta, 2011).  
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THREE AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION 
Organized crime interacts with and contributes to its social and economic 
environment (Van de Bunt, Siegal & Zaitch, 2014). In terms of development, organized 
crime has three main areas of contribution: institutional, social, and economic. Criminal 
organizations make these contributions at any income level, but the effects are different 
across income levels. This paper argues organized crimes effects are positive to 
development in LICs, and harmful to development in MICS.  
Institutionally 
 Organized crime functions as an extra legal authority, it builds up informal 
institutions and establishes rules and norms for the population. Criminal organizations are 
able to do this as they have a high degree of organization and an interest in maintaining 
their environment. In places where the state cannot reach the population, organized crime 
takes advantage of this vacuum by offering public goods and setting rules and norms. 
While criminal organizations services come at a much higher cost that the states would 
(Skaperdas, 2001), they are still able to be used to set up political and economic rules. 
And although informal institutions set up by criminal organizations skirt legality, and do 
not directly translate to formal institutions, they still work to order and organize the 
population. In LICs, this is a positive contribution as organized crimes’ informal 
institutions offer support where the low capacity formal state does not (Yahagi, 2017). In 
MICs, informal institutions set up by organized crime contribute negatively to 
development as they undermine formal institutions, bring corruption into institutions, and 
generally harm good governance (van Dijk, 2007). 
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 An example of the institutional contributions of organized crime is the history of 
drug cartels in Mexico. When Mexico was a low-income one-party state in the late 1900s, 
rural populations had little contact with the formal government. In this vacuum, the needs 
not being met by the state were met by informal institutions backed by cartels. 
Employment opportunities, loans, security – were all provided through informal 
channels. Once Mexico’s ruling party left power in 1994, there was a greater state 
presence in rural areas. Still, cartels were still active and informal institutions persist 
(Pansters, 2018). The extra-legal authority of drug cartels helped Mexico as a LIC, and 
how harms it as a MIC.  
Socially 
 There is a high degree of interaction between organized crime and the social 
environment. Criminal organizations take advantage of and build upon existing social 
structures (Van de Bunt et. al, 2014). As part of their embeddedness in society, criminal 
organizations use societal connections in order to conduct business. As their business 
expands, so do social networks. Additionally, criminal organizations have a high degree 
of internal organization. When dealing with the population, this organization is 
influential. It is important for the survival of organized crime to maintain organization 
and social cohesion, therefore when dealing with outsiders the same rules would be 
applied (Kleemans & Van de Bunt,1999). In LICs, social embeddedness is a positive 
contribution, as organized crime helps organize the population and expand social 
networks. However, in MICs the social aspect of organized crime is harmful as parts of 
the population become tied to illegal activities and the legal institutions that regulate the 
social order may be corrupted or ineffective (Buscaglia & van Dijk, 2003). Additionally, 
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organized crime has a vested interest in hindering effective governance, which inevitably 
has a negative impact on society. 
 The social aspect of organized crime is best seen in Italy. While Italy is a HIC, 
organized crime is historically embedded within the social environment – particularly in 
the southern regions (Bascaglia & van Dijk, 20017. p. 7). Organized crime is a 
recognized force for organization in Italy, and is perhaps the reason the southern regions 
are consistently out-performed by the northern regions economically (Skaperdas, 2001).  
Economically 
 Establishing an informal economy and trading illegal goods for economic gain is 
the primary function of criminal organizations. They build up markets and trading where 
there is some demand not being met by official entities, usually based on illegal goods 
and services (Skaperdas, 2001). In fact, unemployment and low economic opportunity are 
some of the main drivers of organized crime (Ruth, 2014). When formal economic 
opportunity is lacking, that demand is filled by organized crime and the informal 
economy. In LICs, the informal economy brings in revenue and employment (Buscaglia 
& van Dijk, 2003). These benefits do not last to MICs, however, as the informal economy 
cannot be taxed or regulated, hindering development (Shelley, 1998).  
 An example of the economic effects of organized crime is in Ukraine, a country 
where shortly after their independence in 1987, an estimated 50% of the economy was 
informal (Shelley, 1998). Ukraine’s GDP rapidly increased between 1999 and 2008, and 
the country is now firmly stuck in the lower-middle-income category (Ricciardi et. al, 
2020).  
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 Table 2 summarizes each contribution and how the effects are different at the two 
different income levels.  
Table 2. Organized Crime’s Areas of Contribution  
Organized Crime’s 
contribution 
How it helps develop LIC How it harms develop 
MIC 
Institutional: Functions as 
extra-legal authorities  
Establishes informal 
institutions  
Undermines and corrupts 
government formal 
institutions  
Social: Interacts with 
environment 
Organizes population and 
expands social networks 
Captures population, 
impedes legal institutions  
Economic: Establishes 
informal economy  
Brings in revenue, 
encourages trade and offers 
employment 
Cannot tax or regulate 
  
From this, I develop the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: In low-income countries, increased organized crime corresponds to 
increased development  
 As discussed above, organized crime enables LICs to advance to middle-income 
status by establishing informal institutions, playing ordering roles in the population, and 
building up an informal economy. However, these same effects are constraining in MICs 
as it inhibits the state institutions necessary to further promote economic growth. As 
such, I expect the opposite effect in MICs for my second hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 2: In middle-income countries, increased organized crime corresponds 
to decreased development. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study uses multivariate Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Models are tested on 26 LICs, and 70 MICs from 2008 
to 2018.   
Dependent Variable 
 HDI is used to capture human development. HDI is a summary measure of three 
key dimensions of human development: life expectancy at birth, education, and gross 
national income per capita. The scores of each dimension are aggregated into a composite 
index. HDI is useful to capture development in this study as it incorporates outcomes 
from multiple institutions and areas of life.  
 GDP per capita is included to represent economic development. Data is taken 
from the World Bank International Comparison Program. This indicator is used 
specifically to capture how trade and business changes between income levels.  
Independent Variable 
 The GCI measure of organized crime is the measure I employ to capture the direct 
effects of organized crime. This indicator measures the response to the survey question 
“In your country, to what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, 
extortion) impose costs on businesses?”. The GCI codes this indicator from 1 to 7, a 1 
being to a great extent, and a 7 being it imposes no costs. This indicator is included in 
order to capture the direct effects of the most sophisticated and well-organized criminal 
organizations, which have the highest capacity to act as extra-legal authorities. This is a 
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good measure as it specifically deals with organized crime’s operations in the private 
sector.  
 The GCI measure of ethics and corruption is also included to better represent the 
indirect effects of organized crime on governance. Corruption and ethics is a composite 
measure of responses to questions around the diversion of public funds, public trust in 
politicians, and irregular payments and bribes. A value of 1 represents high corruption, 7 
is low corruption. This measure is useful to capture organized crime in the public sector. 
 Due to its informal and secretive nature, the concept of organized crime is 
difficult to measure. It is possible the GCI measures of organized crime and corruption 
are in some ways unreliable. However, it is generally recognized in the scholarly 
community that the GCI’s survey data provides the best available empirical measures of 
organized crime.  
Control Variable 
 Population size is included as a control for the effects of country size on 
development. The data is taken from World Bank reports from 2008 to 2018. It is made 
up of census reports from national statistical offices, Eurostat Demographic Statistics, the 
United Nations Statistical Division, the Population and Vital Statistics Report, the U.S. 
Census Bureau International Database, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
Statistics and Demography Programme (Ricciardi et. al, 2020).  
 Polity (Polity2) is used to capture the effects of regime type on development and 
organized crime. Polity measures if a country is democratic or authoritarian on a scale 
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). Polity2 standardizes Polity 
for time series analysis (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2019).  
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 Durable is used as a proxy measure for conflict in order to control for the effect 
conflict and violence has on developing countries. Durable is a running measure of the 
durability of a regimes authority that represents the number of years since the last 
substantive change in authority characteristics (Marshall et. al, 2019) This is a useful 
control as it focuses on regime change -- which disrupts institutions, and does not include 
general conflict -- which interacts with organized crime and could skew results.  
 Table 3 outlines the mean, range, and number of observations for each variable 
and each income class.   
19 
 
 
 
Table 3. Variable Descriptions  
Variable  Mean All Incomes 
(Mean Low-Income) 
(Mean Middle-
Income) 
Range All Incomes 
(Range Low-Income) 
(Range Middle-Income) 
Number of Observations  
(Number Low-Income) 
(Number Middle-
Income) 
HDI 0.71 
(0.48) 
(0.69) 
0.35 to 0.95 
(0.45 to 0.66) 
(0.45 to 0.84) 
1423 
(260) 
(703) 
GDP per 
capita  
14,989.39 
(737.6748) 
(5,365.792) 
198.3529 to 118,823.65 
(198.3529 to 1602.4035) 
(802.5180 to 16,377.00) 
1401 
(260) 
(692) 
Organized 
Crime 
5.00 
(4.57) 
(4.60) 
1.53 to 6.91 
(2.91 to 6.88) 
(1.53 to 6.76) 
1423 
(260) 
(703) 
Ethics and 
Corruption 
3.5 
(2.8) 
(3.1) 
1.5 to 6.5 
(1.7 to 5.7) 
(1.5 to 5.3) 
1423 
(260) 
(703) 
Population 
Size 
50,079,421 
(23,748,756) 
(74,409,052) 
488,650 to 1,392,730,000 
(1,689,285 to 
152,764,676) 
(517,123 to 
1,392,730,000) 
1423 
(260) 
(703) 
Polity2 5 
(2.2) 
(4.7) 
-10 to 10 
(-9 to 9) 
(-9 to 10) 
1423 
(260) 
(703) 
Durable 31.46 0 to 209 1423 
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(4.57) 
(4.60) 
(0 to 55) 
(0 to 99) 
(260) 
(703) 
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FINDINGS 
 The following models test the relationships between organized crime and 
development at different income levels. Model 1 tests the dependent variable HDI with 
the independent variables organized crime and ethics and corruption in low-income 
countries. Model 2 also includes low income, but tests the dependent variable GDP per 
capita, representing democracy, against organized crime and ethics and corruption. 
Model 3 and model 4 represent middle-income countries and test the independent 
variables against HDI and GDP per capita, respectively. 
Model 1. HDI in Low-Income Countries  
 
Term  estimate    std_error    t-statistic      p_value  
 
intercept                  0.408        0.027          15.02                 0 
organized_crime     0.003           0.007              0.44                 0.661   
Ethics/corruption    0.023             0.008              2.814               0.005     
polity2                    0.003              0.001             2.348                0.02        
durable                  -0.002              0.001            -3.022                0.003   
population_size         0                     0                 1.465                0.144  
 
R_squared              0.099  
 
 Model 1 shows that organized crime is not a statistically significant factor in HDI. 
However, ethics and corruption is significant at the .01 level. Meaning, as corruption 
becomes less prevalent, HDI increases. The control variables are also insignificant. 
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Model 2. GDP per capita in Low-Income Countries 
 
term                    estimate  std_error  t-statistic  p_value  
 
intercept                    442.4      111.3              3.976                 0       
Organized_crime      107.2            28.91            3.707                 0        
ethics/corruption        57.38           33.21           -1.728            0.085    
polity2                         5.72           4.759            1.204             0.32       
durable                         -2               2.471           -0.81              0.419      
population_size             0                   0              -1.23              0.22          
 
R_squared                  0.051 
 
 Both direct and indirect effects of organized crime are significant and positive 
factors for GDP per capita in LICs. Lower levels of organized crime and ethics and 
corruption are strongly correlated with increases in GDP per capita. This model 
contradicts hypothesis 1, which says that in LICs organized crime should help 
development. Interestingly, neither regime type nor durability is significant for GDP per 
capita.  
Model 3. HDI in Middle-Income Countries  
 
term                     estimate std_error t-statistic p_value 
 
intercept                 0.581           0.021               28.2                   0      
organized_crime    0.004           0.004             0.924                0.356      
ethics/ corruption   0.024           0.006             4.12                    0          
polity2                    0.002           0.001             3.044                0.002       
durable                   0.001              0                 3.182                0.002        
population_size         0                  0               -3.111                0.002        
 
R_squared             0.08 
 
 Model 3 moves on to middle-income countries, where organized crime is again 
not significant. Ethics and corruption is significant at the .05 level, meaning less 
corruption leads to an increase in HDI. In this model the control variables are also 
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significant, showing long lasting democracies are positively correlated with increased 
HDI.  
Model 4. GDP per capita in Middle-Income Countries 
 
term                      estimate std_error t-statistic p_value    
 
intercept                  988.4         826.6               1.196              0.232     
organized_crime     267.4         170.7               1.566              0.118   
ethics/corruption     705.6         231.2               3.052              0.002     
polity2                       76.79         27.7               2.772              0.006        
durable                      35.19         8.528             4.127                 0         
population_size           0                0                -3.084              0.002      
 
R_squared               0.084 
 
 In model 4, ethics and corruption is significant for GDP per capita, but organized 
crime is not. This mixed result offers mixed support for hypothesis 2, as corruption 
negatively effects development but organized crime has no effect. The significance of 
polity 2 and durable shows that long lasting democracies are associated with higher levels 
of GDP per capita.  
 The direct effects of organized crime is only significant in one model, GDP per 
capita in LICs. However, the indirect measure of organized crime on governance, ethics 
and corruption, is significant in every model.  This shows that regardless of income level, 
governance is a key factor in development. These results somewhat supported hypothesis 
2, that organized crime should hinder development in MICs. The results do not find any 
support for hypothesis 1, that organized crime should help development in LICs.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper tests how organized crime affects the development of low and middle-
income countries, assuming factors the affect one income group have different effects in 
the other. While economic freedom and informal institutions are traditionally the drivers 
of development in LICs, MICs require more emphasis on good governance to advance 
(Medina-Moral & Montes-Gan, 2018). Good governance is more difficult to establish in 
LICs, as there are often sections of population beyond the reach if the state where, due to 
the vacuum left by the state, organized crime operates as an informal institution to order 
the population (de Olivera & Penev, 2011). Along with informal institutions, criminal 
organizations establish informal economies which offer a source of revenue and 
employment for a part of the population (van Dijk, 2007).  
 For good or ill, organized crime contributes to the environment in three ways-- 
institutionally, socially, and economically. Institutionally, criminal organizations 
establish informal institutions which set rules and norms for the population. These rules 
and norms are helpful in LICs, but harmful in MICs as they undermine and corrupt 
formal institutions. Socially, organized crime works to organize the population and 
expand social networks. While offering social organization in LICs is a positive 
contribution, in MICs organization from criminals entraps the population and hinders 
legal institutions. Economically, organized crime brings in revenue and employment by 
establishing a formal economy-- behavior which helps the trade focused aspects of LIC 
25 
 
 
 
development. However, the informal economy hinders development in MICs as it cannot 
be regulated or taxed.  
 In order to apply this framework empirically, this study tests the effects of mafia 
type organized crime and a measure of ethics and corruption in the public sphere against 
development, measured with HDI and GDP per capita. In nearly every case organized 
crime is not significant to development, with the exception of a strong positive 
correlation with GDP per capita in LICs. In all models, ethics and corruption have a 
significant positive correlation with development, for both HDI and GDP per capita. As 
ethics and corruption is the indicator used to capture the indirect effects on governance 
from organized crime, its significance shows governance is important regardless of 
income level.   
 Organized crime does not positively affect development in low-income countries 
as this study hypothesized. In almost all tests, it is insignificant. In middle-income 
countries, less organized crime and ethics and corruption leads to more development. It is 
possible organized crime has a positive or negative effect on certain institutions in LICs 
that is significant, which would constitute further research.  
 This paper follows an assumption laid out in literature on the middle income trap 
(Galawe & Wagner, 2016) that factors of development have differing effects at different 
income levels, and that the difference in effect explains why so few middle-income 
countries advance to high income. By finding organized crime to be insignificant, this 
paper rules out organized crime as a factor that positively contributes to development in 
low-income countries. Meaning the negative effects of organized crime in middle income 
countries have little to do with the development process.  
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 Based on the literature, it is still probable that factors such as economic freedom, 
informal institutions, and social organization positively effect a countries ability to 
further develop. This study only found that organized crime contribution to these 
developmental factors is not significant.  
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APPENDIX A 
Organized Crime and High-Income Countries
30 
 
 
This paper assumes organized crime’s contributions to LICs continued to hinder 
development in MICs. However, HICs are already developed, so the effects of organized 
crime on development are moot. Given most HICs have a high capacity and reach among 
the population, it is more likely in HICs the state has an effect on organized crime -- not 
the other way around. This appendix tests the effect of development on organized crime 
in and speculates how the organized crime behaves differently in HICs.  
The three areas of contributions are different in HICs compared to LICs and 
MICs. Presumably, institutions should already be established and be able to reach the 
whole population, leaving no room for organized crime to act as extra-legal authorities 
outside of very specific circles. Formal institutions at this income level will present as a 
challenge to criminal organizations, having the capacity to override the informal 
institutions of organized crime in most cases. Corruption will still be present, but should 
be at a lower rate than in LICs or MICs.  
While in HICs organized crime is still embedded within the population, it does 
not have the same ordering roles as it does in LICs and MICs. Theoretically, criminal 
organizations act as an organizing force and social network in lieu of legal channels, as it 
does with the other areas as well. But in HICs, there are legitimate social networks and 
social movements which may be used at a much lower cost than taking part in the social 
aspects of organized crime. Essentially, there is social competition in HICs that does not 
exist in LICs.  
HICs, being high-income, have much larger sources of revenue than the other two 
income groups. As such, the revenue associated with organized crime is insignificant-- 
both to the population and to the state. The majority of citizens do not need to turn to the 
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informal economy to survive, and the lost revenue from not being able to tax the informal 
economy is not large enough to affect the economy of HICs. Instead, the amount of trade 
should influence the amount of organized crime, reverse of what was expected in LICs 
and MICs.  
Table 4. High-Income Variable Descriptions  
Variable  Mean Range  
 
Number of Observations  
HDI 0.87 0.78 to 0.95 460 
GDP per capita 37,796.17 11,527.59 to 118,823.65 449 
Organized Crime 5.75 4.00 to 6.90 460 
Ethics and Corruption 4.56 2.0 to 6.5 460 
Population Size 27,779,946 488,650 to 327,167,434 460 
Polity2 6.6 -10 to 10 460 
 
As shown in table 4, on average HICs have an organized crime value of 5.75, 
compared to MICs 4.60 and LICs 4.57. This means business costs of organized crime are 
lower in HICs than the other two income groups. Ethics and corruption is also lower in 
HICs, with a value of 4.56 compared to MICs 3.05 and LICs 2.84.  
In order to capture the effect of development on organized crime, in this appendix 
independent and dependent variables are reversed. The dependent variables are now the 
GCI measures of organized crime and ethics and corruption. The independent variables 
are HDI and GDP per capita.   
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Model 5. Organized Crime in High-Income Countries 
 
term                               estimate std_error t-statistic p_value   
 
intercept                          1.354             0.802              1.689                0.092          
hdi                                   5.184             0.991              5.233                   0              
gdp_per_cap                       0                   0                   3.407                0.001                 
polity2                            -0.046            0.005              -9.635                   0        
durable                             0.001           0.001                1.515                0.131               
population_size                   0                  0                  -9.041                   0                        
 
R_squared         0.395       
 
As expected, in HICs both HDI and GDP per capita are positive and significant. 
As development increases, the costs associated with organized crime decreases. Polity 2 
and durable are also positive and significant, meaning stable democracies are likely to 
have low amounts of organized crime.  
Model 6. Ethics and Corruption in High-Income Countries 
term                                estimate std_error t-statistic p_value   
 
intercept                           -7.211            0.955            -7.549                0            
hdi                                   13.18              1.18              11.17                  0        
gdp_per_cap                        0                   0                  7.03                  0                   
polity2                             -0.077            0.006          -13.32                   0             
durable                             0.005            0.001              5.003                 0              
population_size                   0                   0                -6.958                  0             
 
R_squared        0.65 
 
For ethics and corruption, HDI and GDP per capita are also significant. As HICs 
become more developed, levels of corruption become lower. Polity 2 and durable are 
again significant, stable democracies should have lower levels of corruption.  
 The contributions of organized crime laid out in this paper assume the state is 
lacking in some aspect which organized crime is able to fill in for. This does not extend 
to HICs, as generally countries that have reached the high-income level have functioning 
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institutions and the capacity to reach the whole of the population. As such, development 
is what effects organized crime, instead of organized crime affecting development.  
